I offer this not as a polished statement, but the first word about how a Libertarian foreign policy might evolve, and what it might look like. I'm more comfortable, actually, with the format than I am with my policy formulations. See what you think, and feel free to ripe me a new onder,
Both Brian Shields and Duffy anticipated my move forward into the aims of American foreign policy in their responses to the first post.
First observation: two completely different starting premises here. Brian has attempted to grasp the essentials of Libertarian philosophy, while Duffy has opted for realpolitik.
Truth in advertising: even before the age of George W. Bush, neocons, and evangelical democracy, I always leaned toward realpolitik.
Second observation: any American foreign policy must start with the world (and the nation) as it is, and move forward from there. There's no going back, for example, to George Washington's pragmatic isolationism and warnings against alliances, because we do have some alliances that we are sworn to honor, and that the American people would not let us dishonor.
But that "world as it is" becomes a slippery prospect, because there is a marked tendency of all policy makers to view the rest of the planet through ideological lenses, engage in groupthink, and then deny any data that would contradict their beliefs. Libertarians should have no illusions that they are not just as susceptible to this phenomenon.
The best you can do, I think, is to lay out your starting premises as clearly as possible.
Here are my premises:
1) While it would be technically feasible for the United States to exist independent of other nations (we are gifted with great space and abundant resources), to do so would result in economic, political, and cultural turmoil the likes of which we have never seen. For better or worse, we exist today in a global economic system, where even the largest and most powerful players are interdependent.
2) Despite the supposed potential of cyberspace, the global marketplace, and mass communications to break down cultural and political barriers, today's world is pretty thoroughly divided into different camps, and likely to stay that way throughout the century. Sweeping change in terms religious (think the early expansion of Islam), cultural (spread of western consumer society), economic (spread of free-market capitalism), ideological (jihadism or communism), political (expansion of new world-wide empires) are increasingly unlikely unless there is a profound paradigmatic breakdown of virtually everything we know. The area from which we may expect the most sweeping change in the coming decades is environmental, and that is one wherein--despite our hopes and pretensions otherwise--humanity can expect to spend the bulk of its time and energy reacting rather than directing.
[Addendum: the obvious weakness of this argument is the inability to project technological breakthroughs. New energy sources, agricultural innovations, or medical advances could materially upset the status quo. And it is likely, given the curves of technological change for the past several decades, that one or more of these things will happen. The problem is: you can't predict which one, or when, or where. You just have to be ready to adapt.]
3) The United States has several long-term allies (Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, and Taiwan [your list might differ]) and at least one long-term alliance (NATO) that cannot be trivially dispensed with. If we are not free to posit a foreign policy in the abstract, but must remain with the world as it is, then we must carefully examine the obligations we have already undertaken.
4) The world is about to become a more violent place, although the violence will be to some extent disjointed and each incident on a smaller scale than we have generally expected in the past. Dislocations associated with global warming, existing inequities in the distribution of resources, populations either starving or infected by disease, and ongoing migrations of peoples without regard to national borders will combine to create a turbulent world. In a best-case scenario there will be regions of relative stability that continue to exist throughout the century; in the worst-case scenario the world's larger economies (North America, Europe, China/Japan, and to some extent Latin America) will become magnets for that violence. Nuclear holocaust will not occur; but nuclear attacks will.
5) The Age of Aquarius is not in the offing. Although it is perhaps theoretically possible that, for example, there is enough potential agricultural production on the planet (if we stop eating beef) to feed all six billion of us an adequate diet, it ain't gong to happen. Nor is the UN going to morph itself through some form of secular immaculate conception into a functional world government. Throughout this century people around the world will still sicken and starve, lie captive and be oppressed, and even at the cost of all our treasure we could not make a significant dent in that. Nor can we force either traditional or authoritarian societies to choose free market capitalism
Now take these "truths" as I see them and turn them into foreign policy statements (with the number referring back to the same numbers above):
1) The United States must be able to protect its vital trading interests throughout the world.
1.A) Even with wind farms, nuclear plants, and solar energy, the United States will remain heavily dependent on foreign energy sources [fossil fuels] for at least the next two decades.
1.B) Rising demand--particularly in Russia, India and China--will tend to make the oil market more volatile and expensive. It is likely, as with China's current overtures toward Angola, that we will see the development of exclusive "client state" relationships verging on the colonial, wherein the consumer nation essentially "pays off" the ruling elite to provide a continued flow of reasonably priced oil. The US cannot ethically play this game, at least not from a Libertarian perspective; so the challenge will be to develop strong bilateral partnerships with oil-producing nations in which we pass up the "quick fix" of extracting oil through payments that maintain the corrupt ruling class. Instead, we will need to invest heavily in these countries in terms of building infrastructure, educational opportunity, medical care and create a "fair trade" relationship. The exchange itself will be ethical in a Libertarian sense; the selection of our partners will be ruthlessly guided by our own strategic necessities. [Among potential partners would be countries like Angola or Nigeria.] This process will not be easy, and will in fact require a complete doctrinal revision of how we do business.
1.C) Protecting our vital trading interests will also require assuming primary responsibility for keeping the sea lanes open, and mandate that we maintain the pre-eminent Navy on the planet, with at least 300 vessels.
1.D) The protection of vital US trading interests will need to be as carefully separated as possible in conceptual and operational terms from the protection of corporate profit interests. Corporations which do business abroad, and the people who work for them, will have to assume the risks such work entails if they expect to reap the profits. We must avoid toppling any more Guatemalan governments to save United Fruit.
2. The United States must give up its commitment to evangelical democracy, gunboat democracy, or manifest destiny, in exchange for a policy of pragmatic non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
2.A) We cannot chose a cultural, an economy, or a political system for other nations. Nor can we topple every dictator or authoritarian regime. With the exception of those nations targeted under item 1.B above, we should not try (except in the extreme case of genocide; see below).
2.B) We cannot be the guarantor of borders or immunity from invasion, except in specific, well-advertised cases in which our treaty obligations or specific trade partnerships commit us to doing so. In those cases, however, our rhetoric must be unambiguous and backed by swift action; hence the need to retain our capability in military force projection.
2.C) Non-interference, however, does not prevent individuals and companies from making informed ethical as well as business decisions about trade and investing. Individuals, corporations, states, universities, etc. with large investment portfolios should be encouraged to invest in those areas wherein basic human rights are best respected, and to divest from areas in which they are not.
2.D) The exception to the foregoing limitations is the case of genocide. I do not mean cultural genocide here, or any of the other "adjectival" genocides, but the real extermination of a people or population. I believe that as a minimum in the conduct of world affairs, non-intervention in authoritative or repressive regimes is one thing, but that toleration or acceptance of genocide is another. I'm not sure how I play out all the details, but I do not that a major component of American foreign policy needs to be that genocide is not acceptable at any time or place. (Yes, I acknowledge all the slippery slope arguments and the difficulties, but there still does have to be a line we will not allow to be crossed.)
3. The United States must select its few long-term allies carefully and exclusively; we should be willing to be trading partners with anyone, friends with anyone who can meet some basic standards, but allies only with a very few, because an alliance with the US needs to be perceived as unbending in the face of aggression.
3.A) Our allies, both pre-existing and chosen for purposes of realpolitik should be loyal. To be an ally of the United States must include (a) a willingness to defend your own borders and national interests (no free ride of not maintaining your own military defense forces); (b) a willingness to assist either directly or indirectly with keeping the sea lanes open and preventing genocide; (c) a willingness to engage in free trade with the US that does not include high tariff walls in either direction.
3.B) The NATO alliance represents something of a special case, and will need to be thoroughly reconsidered in terms of our military commitment.
4. The US must avoid being drawn into local or regional wars/conflicts that do not directly affect us, our allies, or the sea lanes.
4.A) While a first-rate intelligence service, with the ability to use local informants and engage in the activities needed to gather intelligence, is absolutely necessary, the US should reverse its recent policy of using--or supporting the use of--so-called private military companies. Nor should any American citizen functioning as a member or operative for a PMC be provided either with extra protection or any sort of exemption from arrest or prosecution by the sovereign nation in which they are operating. The US cannot afford to employ mercenaries; American citizens who choose to become mercenaries do so entirely at their own risk.
4.B) The US government should take the actions necessary to get out of government subsidized arms trade, except to our closest permanent allies (and even then there should be dire penalties for allowing our materials to pass through their hands). American corporations should otherwise be specifically and strictly limited to selling arms that are at least one full developmental generation behind those possessed by the US and its allies. Moreover, corporations--like American mercenaries--assume all risks and forfeit any right to governmental assistance when entering into the international arms trade.
4.C) US troops should not be committed to peace-keeping missions.
5. The US should conduct a national referendum each decade on the subject of UN membership. US support for the International Monetary Fund should be discontinued. The US should pursue a unilateral program of debt relief for developing nations.
5.A) The decision of whether or not to continue UN membership is too important to be left up to elected officials.
5.B) The IMf is essentially an intrusive, neo-colonial system that coerces third-world nations of the choice to pursue their own strategies of development.
5.C) The US should perform a one-time action to wipe the slate clean for our debtor nations in the developing world. After that, the US will develop strict standards of credit (to include barrier-free trade and government transparency) that must be met before any further loans will be allowed. It is possible that the US will declare a 5-year moratorium on all international lending to former debtor nations whose loans have been forgiven.
There are a lot of loose ends hanging about here; I know that. And I am sure that some of my pet peeves that I have immortalized with their inclusion, will not be shared by many others. That's OK. National foreign policy is a complex subject, and no matter how many rules or principles you lay down there will always be exceptions or mitigating circumstances.
For example: I think a key component of any US foreign policy needs to be a changed War Powers Act that describes the scope (not the time limit) of operations to which the President can commit troops without Congressional approval.
I have not included "defense of the realm" in our foreign policy, because I don't think that IS part of our foreign policy. We have to assess carefully the military requirements and resources necessary to do that job (along with the aforementioned tariff protection above)) We need to pay the price for the best, most compact professional military we can build.
Both Brian Shields and Duffy anticipated my move forward into the aims of American foreign policy in their responses to the first post.
Brian: "The first thing we need, even before the actual policy, is the philosophy of a Libertarian foreign policy, right? A philosophy of freedom, human rights, minimal government interference, organized humanitarianism, and respect for the rest of the world. We have to make sure our philosophy for the rest of the world does not make us hypocrites at home."
Duffy: "Our foreign policy should be: Safeguard free trade between nations (i.e. fight piracy), force open closed markets for reciprocal trade, enforce contracts, protect our national interests, defense of the realm."
First observation: two completely different starting premises here. Brian has attempted to grasp the essentials of Libertarian philosophy, while Duffy has opted for realpolitik.
Truth in advertising: even before the age of George W. Bush, neocons, and evangelical democracy, I always leaned toward realpolitik.
Second observation: any American foreign policy must start with the world (and the nation) as it is, and move forward from there. There's no going back, for example, to George Washington's pragmatic isolationism and warnings against alliances, because we do have some alliances that we are sworn to honor, and that the American people would not let us dishonor.
But that "world as it is" becomes a slippery prospect, because there is a marked tendency of all policy makers to view the rest of the planet through ideological lenses, engage in groupthink, and then deny any data that would contradict their beliefs. Libertarians should have no illusions that they are not just as susceptible to this phenomenon.
The best you can do, I think, is to lay out your starting premises as clearly as possible.
Here are my premises:
1) While it would be technically feasible for the United States to exist independent of other nations (we are gifted with great space and abundant resources), to do so would result in economic, political, and cultural turmoil the likes of which we have never seen. For better or worse, we exist today in a global economic system, where even the largest and most powerful players are interdependent.
2) Despite the supposed potential of cyberspace, the global marketplace, and mass communications to break down cultural and political barriers, today's world is pretty thoroughly divided into different camps, and likely to stay that way throughout the century. Sweeping change in terms religious (think the early expansion of Islam), cultural (spread of western consumer society), economic (spread of free-market capitalism), ideological (jihadism or communism), political (expansion of new world-wide empires) are increasingly unlikely unless there is a profound paradigmatic breakdown of virtually everything we know. The area from which we may expect the most sweeping change in the coming decades is environmental, and that is one wherein--despite our hopes and pretensions otherwise--humanity can expect to spend the bulk of its time and energy reacting rather than directing.
[Addendum: the obvious weakness of this argument is the inability to project technological breakthroughs. New energy sources, agricultural innovations, or medical advances could materially upset the status quo. And it is likely, given the curves of technological change for the past several decades, that one or more of these things will happen. The problem is: you can't predict which one, or when, or where. You just have to be ready to adapt.]
3) The United States has several long-term allies (Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, and Taiwan [your list might differ]) and at least one long-term alliance (NATO) that cannot be trivially dispensed with. If we are not free to posit a foreign policy in the abstract, but must remain with the world as it is, then we must carefully examine the obligations we have already undertaken.
4) The world is about to become a more violent place, although the violence will be to some extent disjointed and each incident on a smaller scale than we have generally expected in the past. Dislocations associated with global warming, existing inequities in the distribution of resources, populations either starving or infected by disease, and ongoing migrations of peoples without regard to national borders will combine to create a turbulent world. In a best-case scenario there will be regions of relative stability that continue to exist throughout the century; in the worst-case scenario the world's larger economies (North America, Europe, China/Japan, and to some extent Latin America) will become magnets for that violence. Nuclear holocaust will not occur; but nuclear attacks will.
5) The Age of Aquarius is not in the offing. Although it is perhaps theoretically possible that, for example, there is enough potential agricultural production on the planet (if we stop eating beef) to feed all six billion of us an adequate diet, it ain't gong to happen. Nor is the UN going to morph itself through some form of secular immaculate conception into a functional world government. Throughout this century people around the world will still sicken and starve, lie captive and be oppressed, and even at the cost of all our treasure we could not make a significant dent in that. Nor can we force either traditional or authoritarian societies to choose free market capitalism
Now take these "truths" as I see them and turn them into foreign policy statements (with the number referring back to the same numbers above):
1) The United States must be able to protect its vital trading interests throughout the world.
1.A) Even with wind farms, nuclear plants, and solar energy, the United States will remain heavily dependent on foreign energy sources [fossil fuels] for at least the next two decades.
1.B) Rising demand--particularly in Russia, India and China--will tend to make the oil market more volatile and expensive. It is likely, as with China's current overtures toward Angola, that we will see the development of exclusive "client state" relationships verging on the colonial, wherein the consumer nation essentially "pays off" the ruling elite to provide a continued flow of reasonably priced oil. The US cannot ethically play this game, at least not from a Libertarian perspective; so the challenge will be to develop strong bilateral partnerships with oil-producing nations in which we pass up the "quick fix" of extracting oil through payments that maintain the corrupt ruling class. Instead, we will need to invest heavily in these countries in terms of building infrastructure, educational opportunity, medical care and create a "fair trade" relationship. The exchange itself will be ethical in a Libertarian sense; the selection of our partners will be ruthlessly guided by our own strategic necessities. [Among potential partners would be countries like Angola or Nigeria.] This process will not be easy, and will in fact require a complete doctrinal revision of how we do business.
1.C) Protecting our vital trading interests will also require assuming primary responsibility for keeping the sea lanes open, and mandate that we maintain the pre-eminent Navy on the planet, with at least 300 vessels.
1.D) The protection of vital US trading interests will need to be as carefully separated as possible in conceptual and operational terms from the protection of corporate profit interests. Corporations which do business abroad, and the people who work for them, will have to assume the risks such work entails if they expect to reap the profits. We must avoid toppling any more Guatemalan governments to save United Fruit.
2. The United States must give up its commitment to evangelical democracy, gunboat democracy, or manifest destiny, in exchange for a policy of pragmatic non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
2.A) We cannot chose a cultural, an economy, or a political system for other nations. Nor can we topple every dictator or authoritarian regime. With the exception of those nations targeted under item 1.B above, we should not try (except in the extreme case of genocide; see below).
2.B) We cannot be the guarantor of borders or immunity from invasion, except in specific, well-advertised cases in which our treaty obligations or specific trade partnerships commit us to doing so. In those cases, however, our rhetoric must be unambiguous and backed by swift action; hence the need to retain our capability in military force projection.
2.C) Non-interference, however, does not prevent individuals and companies from making informed ethical as well as business decisions about trade and investing. Individuals, corporations, states, universities, etc. with large investment portfolios should be encouraged to invest in those areas wherein basic human rights are best respected, and to divest from areas in which they are not.
2.D) The exception to the foregoing limitations is the case of genocide. I do not mean cultural genocide here, or any of the other "adjectival" genocides, but the real extermination of a people or population. I believe that as a minimum in the conduct of world affairs, non-intervention in authoritative or repressive regimes is one thing, but that toleration or acceptance of genocide is another. I'm not sure how I play out all the details, but I do not that a major component of American foreign policy needs to be that genocide is not acceptable at any time or place. (Yes, I acknowledge all the slippery slope arguments and the difficulties, but there still does have to be a line we will not allow to be crossed.)
3. The United States must select its few long-term allies carefully and exclusively; we should be willing to be trading partners with anyone, friends with anyone who can meet some basic standards, but allies only with a very few, because an alliance with the US needs to be perceived as unbending in the face of aggression.
3.A) Our allies, both pre-existing and chosen for purposes of realpolitik should be loyal. To be an ally of the United States must include (a) a willingness to defend your own borders and national interests (no free ride of not maintaining your own military defense forces); (b) a willingness to assist either directly or indirectly with keeping the sea lanes open and preventing genocide; (c) a willingness to engage in free trade with the US that does not include high tariff walls in either direction.
3.B) The NATO alliance represents something of a special case, and will need to be thoroughly reconsidered in terms of our military commitment.
4. The US must avoid being drawn into local or regional wars/conflicts that do not directly affect us, our allies, or the sea lanes.
4.A) While a first-rate intelligence service, with the ability to use local informants and engage in the activities needed to gather intelligence, is absolutely necessary, the US should reverse its recent policy of using--or supporting the use of--so-called private military companies. Nor should any American citizen functioning as a member or operative for a PMC be provided either with extra protection or any sort of exemption from arrest or prosecution by the sovereign nation in which they are operating. The US cannot afford to employ mercenaries; American citizens who choose to become mercenaries do so entirely at their own risk.
4.B) The US government should take the actions necessary to get out of government subsidized arms trade, except to our closest permanent allies (and even then there should be dire penalties for allowing our materials to pass through their hands). American corporations should otherwise be specifically and strictly limited to selling arms that are at least one full developmental generation behind those possessed by the US and its allies. Moreover, corporations--like American mercenaries--assume all risks and forfeit any right to governmental assistance when entering into the international arms trade.
4.C) US troops should not be committed to peace-keeping missions.
5. The US should conduct a national referendum each decade on the subject of UN membership. US support for the International Monetary Fund should be discontinued. The US should pursue a unilateral program of debt relief for developing nations.
5.A) The decision of whether or not to continue UN membership is too important to be left up to elected officials.
5.B) The IMf is essentially an intrusive, neo-colonial system that coerces third-world nations of the choice to pursue their own strategies of development.
5.C) The US should perform a one-time action to wipe the slate clean for our debtor nations in the developing world. After that, the US will develop strict standards of credit (to include barrier-free trade and government transparency) that must be met before any further loans will be allowed. It is possible that the US will declare a 5-year moratorium on all international lending to former debtor nations whose loans have been forgiven.
There are a lot of loose ends hanging about here; I know that. And I am sure that some of my pet peeves that I have immortalized with their inclusion, will not be shared by many others. That's OK. National foreign policy is a complex subject, and no matter how many rules or principles you lay down there will always be exceptions or mitigating circumstances.
For example: I think a key component of any US foreign policy needs to be a changed War Powers Act that describes the scope (not the time limit) of operations to which the President can commit troops without Congressional approval.
I have not included "defense of the realm" in our foreign policy, because I don't think that IS part of our foreign policy. We have to assess carefully the military requirements and resources necessary to do that job (along with the aforementioned tariff protection above)) We need to pay the price for the best, most compact professional military we can build.
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