You have to wonder if he has a life....

Is it insomnia or the total lack of a life beyond my kids' YMCA basketball programs that keeps me up writing posts than anyone with any sense would know are too long to attract and hold an audience?

Good damn question.

Anyway....

I like old books. In today’s world this is not necessarily a virtue, but then I’m not necessarily (by preference) a virtuous person.

Recently I was attracted to the title of a 1958 (!) sociological study of an southern Italian village (called Montegrano to disguise the real identity): The Moral Basis of a Backward Society by Edward C. Banfield.

Loved the title; couldn’t resist.

You also need to know that I am working on two more lengthy posts (does anybody actually read these or am I indulging in mental masturbation?), one to be entitled, “Why Cities Suck (resources)” and another as yet untitled about the apathy of Delaware voters.

The “predictive hypothesis” of this book, although very much a “period piece,” struck me as containing insights into both questions, and I wanted to share it with you. As you read, think alternately: inner cities and First State apathy.

(I am quoting enough of this book that technically I am probably violating copyright, but I suspect that if Banfield is even still alive he won’t complain.)

Excerpted from pages 83-110:

A very simple hypothesis will make intelligible all of the behavior about which questions have been raise and will enable an observer to predict how the Montegranesi will act in concrete circumstances. The hypothesis is that the Montegranesi act as if they were following this rule:

Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do the same.

One whose behavior is consistent with this rule will be called an “amoral familist.’ The term is awkward and somewhat imprecise (one who follows the rule is without morality only in relation to persons outside the family—in relation to family members, he applies standards of right and wrong; one who has no family is of course an “amoral individualist”), but no other term seems better….

Banfield’s seventeen predictive rules of “amoral familism” follow. I have pulled out the rules and left out the detailed examples:

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1. In a society of amoral familists, no one will further the interests of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so.

2. In a society of amoral familists only officials will concern themselves with public affairs, for only they are paid to do so. For a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem will be regarded as abnormal and even improper.

3. In a society of amoral familists there will be few checks on officials, for checking on officials will be the business of other officials only.

4. In a society of amoral familists, organizations (i.e., deliberately concerted action) will be very difficult to achieve and maintain. The inducements which lead people to contribute their activity to organizations are to an important degree unselfish (e.g., identification with the purpose of the organization) and they are often non-material (e.g., the intrinsic interest of the activity as a ‘game’). Moreover, it is a condition of successful organization that members have some trust in each other and some loyalty to the organization. In an organization with high morale it is taken for granted that they will make small sacrifices, and perhaps even large ones, for the sake of the organization.

5. In a society of amoral familists, office-holders, feeling no identification with the purposes of the organization, will not work harder than necessary to keep their places or (if such is within the realm of possibility) to earn promotion. Similarly, professional people and educated people generally wil lack a sense of mission or calling. Indeed, official position and special training will be regarded by their possessors as weapons to be used against others for private advantage.

6. In a society of amoral familists, the law will be disregarded when there is no reason to fear punishment. Therefore individuals will not enter into agreements which depend upon legal processes for their enforcement unless it is likely that the law will be enforced and unless the cost of securing enforcement will not be so great as to make the undertaking unprofitable.

7. The amoral familist who is an office-holder will take bribes when he can get away with it. But whether he takes bribes or not, it will be assumed by the society of amoral familists that he does.

8. In a society of amoral familists the weak will favor a regime which will maintain order with a strong hand.

9. In a society of amoral familists, the claim of any person or institution to be inspired by zeal for public rather than private advantage will be regarded as fraud.

10. In the society of amoral familists there will be no connection between abstract political principle (i.e., ideology) and concrete behavior in the ordinary relationships of every day life.

11. In a society of amoral familists there will be no leaders and no followers. No one will take the initiative in outlining a course of action and persuading others to embark upon it (except as it may be to his private advantage to do so) and if oe did offer leadership, the group would refuse it out of distrust.

12. The amoral familist will use his ballot to secure the greatest material gain in the short run. Although he may have decided views as to his long-term interest, his class interest or the public interest, these will not effect his vote if the family’s short-run, material advantage is in any way involved.

13. The amoral familist will value gains accruing to the community insofar as he and his are likely to share them. In fact, he will vote against measures which will help the community without helping him because, even though his position is unchanged in absolute terms, he considers himself worse off if his neighbors’ position changes for the better. Thus it may happen that measures which are of decided general benefit will provoke a protest vote from those who feel that they have not shared in them or have not shared in them sufficiently.

14. In a society of amoral familists the voter will place little confidence in the promises of the parties. He will be apt to use his ballot to pay for favors already received (assuming, of course, that more are in prospect) rather than for favors which are merely promised.

15. In a society of amoral familists it will be assumed that whatever group is in power is self-serving and corrupt. Hardly will an election be over before the voters will conclude that the new officials are enriching themselves at their expense and that they have no intention of keeping the promises they have made. Consequently, the self-serving vote will use his ballot to pay the incumbents not for benefits but for injuries, i.e., he will use it to administer punishment.

16. Despite the willingness of voters to sell their votes, there ill be no strong or stable political machines in a society of amoral familists. This will be true for at least three reasons: (a) the ballot being secret, the amoral voter cannot be depended upon to vote as he has been paid to vote; (b) there will not be enough short-run material gain from a machine to attract investment in it; and (c) for reasons explained above, it will be difficult to maintain formal organization of any kind whatever.

17. In a society of amoral familists, party workers will sell their services to the highest bidders. Their tendency to change sides will make for sudden shifts in strength of the parties at the polls.

Food for thought, eh?